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ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: IN SEARCH
OF A TREATY TO LOCATE ASSETS ABROAD
Luke J. Umstetter
I. INTRODUCTION

AND SCOPE

The United States' continual increase in social, political and
economic interaction with countries has been followed by the predictable
increase in related legal interactions. Less predictable is the likelihood of
satisfying a judgment in a jurisdiction where legal practices differ from those
of the United States. U.S. judgments are routinely refused enforcement
abroad, and little recourse is available because sovereigns are generally
powerless to enforce civil judgments outside their own political borders.
Questions about the enforcement of foreign judgments increase transaction
costs and complicate business, making it necessary for internationally involved
companies to adapt behaviors to individual jurisdictions.' The practice of
anticipating litigation can be inefficient as most major companies do not
interact with entities in just one other country. For these multinational
corporations (MNCs), transaction costs are also higher than necessary because
the current system reduces the ability to predict or hedge against the outcome
Further results of such uncertainties are price3
of litigation abroad. 2
fluctuations and decreased efficiency in international production and trade.
Despite the high costs, disputes are arising with increased frequency, creating
the need for a standardized mechanism to recognize and execute judgments
practically.
U.S. involvement in multilateral judgment enforcement treaty is not a
new idea. The Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition of Foreign
* JD, University of South Carolina School of Law 2007; International MBA,
University of South Carolina Moore School of Business 2007; B.A. Political Science
2002; B.A. Philosophy 2003, College of Charleston. I would like to thank my family
for their support and the members of the South Carolina Journal of International Law
and Business for their careful editing and insight. This article is dedicated to my
grandfather, Joseph John Umstetter.
1 Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American" Foreign Judgments be Enforced? 88
MINN. L. REV. 783, 849 (2004).
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Judgments has been under negotiations since 1993. 4 These negotiations,
initiated by the United States, are conducted under the auspices of The Hague
Conference on Private International Law, which has produced, other
agreements including: The Hague Service Convention (1965), The Hague
Evidence Convention (1970), and The Hague Child Abduction Convention
(1998).
Europe successfully adopted the Brussels Regulation (formerly
Convention) on Judgment Recognition and Enforcement in 1968, which
served to decrease trade barriers and stimulate the economy. It can serve as an
important model to the United States both because Europe is a major trade and
business partner and because it has had this sophisticated and effective
judgments recognition agreement firmly in place for many years.6 The United
States is not party to this or any similar convention partly because of our
geographical alienation, but also because our judicial system is far more
exotic, excessive, and unpredictable than those of other countries.
In order to successfully negotiate a Treaty on Judgment Enforcement,
the United States should weaken its position on some peripheral issues, defer
to similar provisions utilized in other judgment enforcement treaties, and allow
countries to refuse enforcement in the event that a signatory judgment runs
directly contrary to the stated and widely understood public policy of the
enforcing country as found in the treaty.
II. BACKGROUND

Absent a treaty on the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, the United States and other foreign countries must look to domestic
law and principles of comity, reciprocity and res judicata.7 The best starting
point for a common law discussion of the enforcement of foreign money
judgments is with Hilton v. Guvot. This area developed at common law and
has been partially adopted by statute. 8 As in many other areas of law, English
precedents provided guidance to U.S. decisions on recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments prior to the Hilton judgment. From the
mid-nineteenth century, U.S. courts began to accord conclusive rather than
4 Memorandum from Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Linda Silberman to the
American Law Institute (Nov. 30, 1998), availableat http://www.ali.org/ali/1999 Low
enl.htm
[hereinafter Lowenfeld & Silberman].
5
1d.

6 Council

Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 12) I(EC) [hereinafter Brussels

Regulation].
7 Hihon v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
8 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §481(1) (1987) [hereinafter
FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT].
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merely prima facie effect to foreign judgments for all purposes, subject to
certain conditions and exceptions. 9 U.S. courts have not articulated a
consistent policy or rationale for recognizing foreign judgments, and are
usually content to cite the general principles of comity identified in Hilton. "0
The foundation for this discussion begins with the concept of sovereignty, a
basic tenant of which is that no law has any effect, in and of itself, beyond the
limits of the political milieu from which its authority is derived. The extent to
which the law of one nation, as put in force within that nation's territory
through executive order, legislative act, or judicial decree, shall be allowed to
operate within the dominion of another nation, depends upon what our greatest
jurists have been content to call "the comity of nations."'' In Hilton, which
involved a French plaintiff seeking to enforce a French judgment against a
U.S. defendant, Justice Gray gave his enduring and often quoted definition of
comity:
Comity in a legal sense is neither a matter of absolute
obligation on one hand, nor a mere courtesy and good will
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard for both
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens or other persons who are under the protections of

its laws.

12

The decision went on to list more specific requirements for
recognition and enforcement, which included: full and fair trial abroad, regular
proceedings, voluntary appearance, and the impartial and non-fraudulent
administration of justice. 13
Although issues of reciprocity ultimately decided Hilton, more recent
decisions have rejected the concept. 14 No case since Hilton has denied
recognition to a foreign judgment solely on the grounds that the foreign

9 ROBERT B. VON MEHREN & MICHAEL E. PATTERSON, RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 22 (1972) (citing

Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign Countr' Judgnents and the Restatement of Conflict of
Lawvs in the United States, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220 (1972)).
'0 /d. at 23.
1 Hilton, 195 U.S. at 202.
12 id.
" Id. at 202-03.
14Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 n.8
(3d Cir. 1971).
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country would not recognize a U.S. judgment. !5 U.S. courts, most notably in
New York, have "expressly rejected the Hilton requirement of reciprocity and
extended recognition of foreign judgments" without even addressing
reciprocity. 6 A more recent view on the subject is that judicial economy and
international comity play a much larger role than the reciprocity analysis put
forth in Hilton v. Guvot. 17 However, this more recent comity analysis is
simultaneously being displaced by the idea that the underlying policy should
be similar to policies of res judicata and collateral estoppel, favoring finality
and ending litigation rather than merely acceding to the laws of another
nation. 18 Although these theoretical divergences do not alter the effect, they
might provide the appropriate focus and methodology required for an effective
judgment treaty.
The goals of the Hilton decision were ostensibly to limit American
liability abroad while at the same time encourage foreign nations to enforce
U.S. judgments. If so, deciding the case based on reciprocity was not the most
effective method.' 9 Since a vast majority of foreign states have reciprocity
requirements, there is potential for circular non-recognition that would be
unfavorable to the international economic system as a whole. For example, a
nation with a reciprocity requirement will generally require a showing that its
judgments would likewise be given effect in the judgment creditor's nation
before it will agree to enforce the judgment. 20 Accordingly, foreign courts
will often refuse recognition of a U.S. judgment based on the incorrect
conclusion that because we do not have a definitive statutory provision
relating to the enforcement of foreign judgments, we would not reciprocate
their inbound judgment. 2 '
It is widely recognized that a multilateral agreement would serve to
encourage commercial relations, and also to avoid the appearance of hostility
15 Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second
Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 220, 235 n. 90 (1972).
16 See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868. (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also

Somportex, 453 F.2d 435, 440, at n.8.
17 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 22.
18Id. (quoting Hilton v Guyot, 155 U.S. 113, 202 (1895)).
19See Mata v. American Life Ins. Co., 771 F.Supp. 1375 (D. Del. 1991), affd
961 F.2d 208 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting the Minnesota Supreme Court in Nicol v. Tanner,
310 Minn 68, 256 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. 1976)).
20 Brandon B. Danford, The Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the
United States and Europe: How Can We Achieve a Comprehensive Treaty? 23 REv.
LITIG. 381, 384 (2004) (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227-28 (1895) (refusing
to uphold a French judgment because a similar American judgment would not be
upheld in a French court)).
21 Id. at 422.
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by the United States to foreign judgments.22 An agreed upon mechanism for
recognition and enforcement would minimize such issues and leave political,
judicial, and business resources to more productive ends.
III. THE DOCTRINE OF RECOGNITION

AND ENFORCEMENT

Recognition and enforcement are often used synonymously in
A foreign
modem court cases, but have different practical meanings.
judgment is recognized "when a court concludes that a certain matter has
already been" legitimately decided, whereas the judgment is enforced "when a
party is accorded the relief to which the judgment entitles him[sic].,, 23 It
follows that, while a court must recognize every foreign judgment it enforces,
it will not necessarily enforce every foreign judgment it recognizes. It is
therefore possible for a U.S. court to recognize a foreign court judgment but
not grant the relief entitled by the foreign jurisdiction or vice versa.
Recognition and enforcement of judgments in the United States are
far more complex than in other countries. The bifurcated federal and state
judicial structure in the United States precludes simple and universal
answers. 24 Results can depend on whether the court applies state precedent,
federal case law, general common2 law principles or the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgment Recognition Act.
A. The Uniform ForeignMoney Judgment Recognition Act
Another solution to improving the fate of U.S. money judgments
abroad is through the voluntary state adoption of The Uniform Foreign Money
Judgment Recognition Act (UFMJRA). 26 The UFMJRA, first written in 1962,
is an attempt by the United States to create transparency and lucidity for its
domestic law regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.27
The UFMJRA is applicable only to money judgments and basically codifies
the common law to increase the likelihood that U.S. judgments are enforced in

22 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON,

supra note 9, at 58.

23 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 16.
24

25

id.
Id.
note 9, at 57.
Jennifer M Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the

26 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra
27

International Race to Judgment in Disputes Over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45
HARV. INT'L L.J. 239, 253. (2004). (citing Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E.
Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments in the United
States, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 42 (1974)).
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21

Section 3 of the UFMRJA provides
countries with reciprocity requirements.
that, "a foreign judgment... is conclusive between the parties to the extent that
it grants or denies recovery of a sum of money. The foreign judgment is
enforceable in the same manner as a judgment of a sister state which is entitled
to full faith and credit.",29 Once recognized, the inbound judgment carries the
same weight as if it were from another American state. Currently, the
UFMJRA "has been adopted in 28 states, the District of Columbia and the
Virgin Islands." 30 Four of the states enacting the UFMJRA have added
reciprocity requirements to the versions of the Act they have adopted,3 '
including Colorado, which bars recognition of foreign judgments because it
limits recognition to judgments of a country that has joined the United States
in a judgment-recognition treaty.3 2 However, no such country or treaty yet
exists.
While domestic judgments rendered by sister states are entitled to full
faith and credit under the U.S. Constitution,33 foreign inbound judgments are
not. Due to the lack of uniformity among the states, it is possible that an
inbound judgment may be enforceable in one state but not another. State law
governs judgment recognition and enforcement, even when such recognition is
sought in federal court. 34 Unlike the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution, a treaty could include elaborate provisions for not only
jurisdiction, but also more uniform guidelines for recognizing and enforcing
judgments.3 5
When a properly authenticated foreign judgment is valid on its face,
"U.S. courts generally presume the necessary prerequisites are met unless
challenged by the defendant., 3 6 Absent major violations of due process,
policy or justice, U.S. courts have traditionally been quite liberal in

28 See Commissioners Prefatory Note to the Uniform Recognition Act, 9B

64 (1966).
Uniform
Law Ann.Foreign
29 Uniform
Money Judgment Recognition Act § 4(b), 13 U.L.A. 264
(1986) [hereinafter UFMJRA].
30 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4473 (2d ed. 2006).
3 Ga. Code Ann. §9-12-114 (1993); Idaho Code Ann. §10-1404 (1990); Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 235 §23A (1985); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §36.005 (1986).
32 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-62-102(1) (1997).
33 U.S. Constitution. art. IV, § 1.
34Tonga Air Services, Ltd. v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204, 208, 118 Wash.2d 718, 726.
35Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 4.
36 GEORGE B. MURR, ENFORCING AND RESISTING JUDGMENTS, IN, INTERNATIONAL
LITIGATION: DEFENDING AND SUING FOREIGN PARTIES IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS 345

(David J.Levy ed. 2003).
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recognizing and enforcing inbound judgments.37 Professors von Mehren and
Trautman have even suggested that domestic courts should not refer
automatically to either foreign or domestic rules, but instead begin from the
assumption that "American law probably accords broader conclusive effects to
domestic judgment s than does any other legal system. 38 A reflection of this
liberal enforcement is the fact that U.S courts will probably enforce judgments
based on causes of action that do not exist in the United States. As Judge
Cardozo observed, "We are not so provincial as to say that every solution of a
problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at home."39 For
example, U.S. courts have enforced foreign judgments awarding attorney's
fees or damages for loss of business goodwill despite the fact that US law
generally does not allow for these types of recoveries.40
Generally, a foreign state claims and exercises the right to examine
judgments for four causes: (1) to determine if the court had jurisdiction; (2) to
determine whether the defendant was properly served; (3) to determine if the
proceedings were vitiated by fraud; and (4) to establish that the judgment is
not contrary to the public policy of the country.4 Some countries, including
the Nordic countries, the Netherlands, and Saudi Arabia may refuse to

37International

Nutrition Co., v. Horphag Research Ltd, 257 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (enforcing a French judgment regarding patent ownership based on comity and
found there to be no public policy violation in the French Court's determination);
Pariente v. Scott Meredith Literary Agency, Inc., 771 F. Supp. 609 (S.D. N.Y. 1991)
(enforcing French judgment rendered according to a local custom requiring literary
agents to verify that heir clients indeed own the litereary rights that they are purporting
to sell); Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V. E. B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892 (S.D. N.Y.
1968) (awarding res judicata effect to a decision of the West German Supreme Court
with respect to the question of whether the plaintiff was the successor in interest to a
foundation that was the owner of certain U.S. trademarks); Lenchyshn v. Pelko Elec.,
Inc., 723 N.Y.S.2d 285 (2001) (regognizing money judgement rendered in Canada
resulting from royalties dispute, even though the court had no personal jurisdiction over
the defendants).
38Wright, miller & Cooper, supra note 30, at § 4473.
39Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N.Y. 99, Ill, 120 N.E. 198
(1918).
40 Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement
of Foreign
Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis, 18 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 795, 800 (1996)
(citing Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 8 (3d
Cir. 197 1)).
41 U.S. Department of State, Judicial Assistance, http://travel.state.gov
/law/info/judicial/udicial_691 .html (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
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recognize a foreign judgment absent the existence of a judgment convention
between the rendering and recognizing countries. 42
A treaty is important because the United States is involved in a great
deal of trans-border litigation, making the continued use of common law's
varied approach extremely inefficient and unpredictable. This situation has
been simplified by the gradual adoption of the UFMJRA, but at the same time
complicated because it has not been uniformly adopted. The United States
must continue to work to replace this federalized approach with an
international view aligned with our economic partners.
B. Examples of Groundsfor Non-Recognition
1. Jurisdiction
Lack of jurisdiction is the most common ground for non-recognition
of U.S. judgments. For example, in England and Wales, it is not sufficient that
U.S. courts assert jurisdiction based on U.S. law when enforcing judgments.
Instead, jurisdiction must be according to English rules of conflicts of laws.43
Other countries such as Switzerland, South Africa, France, Italy, Spain and
Mexico take a narrow view when considering whether a U.S. court had
jurisdiction over a defendant. 4 South Africa will refuse to recognize a
judgment if it is not in accord with South African rules, meaning that long arm
style assertions of jurisdiction, among others, are systematically denied.4 .
On the other hand, Mexico and Spain are more likely to allow U.S.
assertion of jurisdiction as long as it is similar to the rules of the enforcing
country.46 Canada takes a more expansive approach as reflected in the recent
case Morguard Investments v. DeSavoye.47 A Canadian court will look at
factors very similar to those upon which jurisdiction is based in the United
States.48
Under the proposed Hague convention, the universal basis of
adjudicatory jurisdiction will be the domicile, habitual residence, or principal
42 Lectric Law Library, Recognizing and Enforcing Foreign Money Judgments,
http://www.lectlaw.com//filesibul I2.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
43 Committee on Foreign and Comparative Law, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Survey on Foreign Recognition of U.S. Money Judgments 5
(2001)[hereinafter NY Bar Survey].
4' id. at 6-7.
41 Id. at 6
' Id. at 7.
47 [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
" See id.
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place of business of the defendant. 49 Other basis of jurisdiction may include
probable place of injury in a tort action, place of performance of a contract,
50
and the domicile of the insured in an action based on an insurance contract.
2. Public Policy
At some level, public policy is the underlying basis for all grounds
under which foreign judgments are denied recognition even though courts
regularly use the term in connection with lack of jurisdiction, inadequate
notice, and fraud. 51 The public policy test can be generally stated as, "whether
the foreign judgment proceeding was conducted in a manner, or was based on
a cause of action so contrary to the laws of the recognizing forum that
recognition or enforcement of the judgment would be seriously offensive to
the state's notions of fairness or policy.' 52 The problem is that there is a
fundamental political and cultural disharmony between the U.S. legal system
and others around the world, creating an impediment to U.S. judgment
recognition abroad.53 Many foreign jurisdictions are often apprehensive of
several areas of U.S. law. Although a detailed discussion of the many
reasons 54 that that are used in refusing to enforce U.S. judgments is beyond the
scope of this paper, the four principal public policy grounds for refusal
include: (1) judgments awarding multiple or punitive damages; (2) judgments
deemed to have the effect of unacceptable restraining trade; (3) judgments
based on decisions grounded in novel causes of action; (4) judgments deemed
55
to be based on U.S. public law or having criminal or quasi-criminal nature.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION

Including foreign judgments in the realm of federal legislation would
have many benefits and would avoid many of the problems presented by state
laws. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the question of whether federal
or state law governs the recognition of foreign judgments. State courts are
often unprepared to render a decision on the enforcement of an inbound
49
50

Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 4, at 2.
d.

51von

Mehren & Patterson, supra note 9, at 39.
id.
53NY Bar Survey, supra note 43, at 4.
54 Other Grounds for Non-Recognition include: Inadequate notice, lack of
opportunity to defend, lack of finality, no review of the merits, reciprocity, choice of
law, expiration of time limits, conflict with other proceedings, no proof of judgment
and fraud make up the remainder of the areas under which an inbound judgment may
be refused recognition by the enforcing court.
52

55

id.
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judgment either because there is no common law to provide precedent or
because the state legislature has not completely developed its substantive and

procedural guidelines.56 The consensus among state courts and lower federal
courts is that recognition is governed by state law and federal courts will apply
the law of the state in which they sit.:" However, federal law would likely be
applied to prevent the application of a state law rule if such application would
result in the disruption or embarrassment of the foreign relations of the United
States. 58 Since the U.S. Constitution vests the conduct of foreign affairs in the
Federal Government 59, it would not be extraordinary if the Supreme Court
found that the recognition of foreign judgments so directly affects U.S. foreign
relations that it needed to be governed by a uniform body60 of federal law rather
than by the potentially conflicting laws of various states.
In 1968, the Supreme Court decision in Zscherning v. Miller held that
certain state laws were invalid to the extent that they caused states to make
value judgments into the administration of foreign laws. The Court decided
that state inquiries into the inheritance rights of aliens which were not
reciprocated to U.S. citizens intruded on the federal domain of international
and diplomatic relations. 6' This analysis could possibly be applied to a State's
refusal to enforce an inbound judgment since non-recognition could involve
similar interference.
V. SOURCES OF CONFUSION IN THE CURRENT SYSTEM

Along with the UFMJRA, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relations is a widely recognized authority providing another element to be

considered by a foreign court. The Restatement looks to principles developed
by interstate judgment recognition cases and indicates that basic American
laws regarding recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are entitled
62
Comment (c) to §481 suggests
to recognition in courts in the United States.

that the same general rules regarding recognition apply to foreign judgments
as they do between sister states.63 Also, if the rendering court lacks
jurisdiction over the defendant or the proceeding was not conducted in a
56 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 17.

•57 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
58

ABA

SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, ENFORCING FOREIGN

JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD

6-7,

n.28(Ronald A. Brand, ed. 1992) [hereinafter ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS].
59 United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.

203 (1942).

60 VON MEHREN & PATTERSON, supra note 9, at 17.

61Zscheming v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
62FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 8, at § 481(1).
63Id. at §481 cmt (c).
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manner consisted with due process, the U.S. court cannot enforce the inbound
judgment. 64 A major difference between the Restatement approach and the
UFMJRA's approach is that the UFMJRA treats subject matter jurisdiction as
mandatory grounds for non-recognition the Restatement leaves it to the court's
discretion. 65 Other discretionary grounds for non-recognition include: (1) due
to inadequate notice of proceedings, the defendant did not have enough time to
properly defend himself ; (2) the judgment is a result of fraud; (3) the
judgment is contrary to the enforcement of a state's public policy; (4) the
judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment; (5) the foreign
forum conducted a proceeding contrary to an arbitration agreement; (6) if
jurisdiction is based on personal service and the forum is seriously
inconvenient.66
If the enforcing state has not adopted a version of the UFMJRA or
Restatement, the state will look to prior decisions providing applicable
common law rules. Ifthe issue is of first impression, the state will examine
federal court decisions. Even though inbound judgments are currently
recognized under state law, due to the nature of the parties in the proceedings,
many inbound enforcement cases tend to be in federal court due to diversity
jurisdiction. Federal courts must then determine what the state courts would
have decided if faced with the same issues. 67 For example, in South Carolina
National Bank v.Westpac Banking Corporation,68 the court recognized an
Australian judgment on the assumption that South Carolina would have
adopted principles of comity. Although it was a matter of first impression in
South Carolina, the opinion indicated that it gave some credence to the fact
that,
The only South Carolina authority on the enforceability of
foreign judgments of which this court is aware is the S.C.
Attorney General's opinion that 'the courts of this state would
accept the judgment of a Court of Denmark6 9 as conclusive upon
the merits of the case tried in such a court.'
Similarly, when deciding whether to allow enforcement of an
judgment, foreign courts often look to the United States to determine if our

64Id.

at § 482(1).
See UFMJRA, supra note 29, at §4;
note 8, at §§481-82.
65

66id.
67 Erie R.R. Co. v.
68 South Carolina

S.C.. 1987).
69 Id. at 597, n. 2.

FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Nat'l Bank v. Westpac Banking Corp., 678 F.Supp. 596 (D.
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courts would enforce a similar judgment going in the opposite direction.
Given the confusion that our own Federal Courts have in applying law under
the Erie doctrine, foreign courts should not be expected to clearly understand
the differences between a federal court applying federal law and federal court
applying state law. Foreign courts often encounter considerable difficulty in
determining what law the non-forum court would have applied, especially
considering differences in the legal systems, languages and cultures. 71 If and
when a foreign court is able to decide which state's law to apply, it then must
look to decide whether the issue can be determined by statute or case law,
another conceptually difficult task, especially for civil law courts. 72 If there is
no direct state law or precedent on the matter, foreign courts must then
consider whether applicable law may be found in prior federal court decisions
or inferred from the law of sister states7 3
Considering this maze of complexity that coincides with the
fundamentally different system of law in America, it is no wonder that U.S.
outbound judgments go under-enforced. Comity and international relations
notwithstanding, the sheer volume of U.S. dollars exchanged outside our
border suggests that it is generally in the best interest of the United States to
enforce the judgments of foreign courts in order that such enforcement be
reciprocated. The fact that this enforcement may not reliably or predictably
fall neatly under state law means that a multilateral treaty or series of bilateral
agreements are essential in a global economy.7 4

VI. TREATY NEGOTIATIONS
Judgments and jurisdiction are governed by a combination of
international, regional and domestic laws often resulting in complex and
75
irregular rules increasing the cost of transnational commercial activity.
International cooperation by means of a judgment treaty is important to
encourage the free-flow of business between borders. Examples of this

70 Danford, supra note 20 at 384.
71 ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS, supra note 58, at 24.
72 id.

73 Id. (citing Somportex v. Pennsylvania Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d
Cir. 1971)).
74 Rosen, supra note 1, at 794.
75Minehan, supra note 40.
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cooperation include The Hague Evidence Convention 76 and The Hague
Service of Process Convention. 77
As Judge Wilkey in Tahan v. Hodgson wrote:
As commerce becomes increasingly international in character,
it is essential [to] recognize and respect the laws of [other]
nations. Foreign tribunals cannot have one set of laws for their
own citizens and another, more favorable set for the citizens of
other countries. It is also essential that American courts
recognize and respect the judgments entered into by foreign
courts to the greatest extent consistent with our own ideals of
justice and fair play. Unfettered trade, good will among
stable international and national
nations, and a vigorous and
78
economy demand no less.
If the United States were to enter a multilateral treaty recognizing and
encouraging the free flow of judgments, many specific and general
sovereignty interests must be accommodated. If negotiations in these key
areas continue to fail, the treaty will suffer the same fate since other countries
have far less to gain from a treaty than the United States.
Current negotiations fail at many different levels. The general
interests being negotiated include those of; the litigating parties, the issuing
country, the recognizing country and the international system as a whole. An
issuing country generally has two main interests in the enforcement of its
judgment. The first reflects the policy concern underlying the act of state
doctrine; that the official acts of a foreign government are respected by other
governments. 79 The comity analysis in Hilton v. Guyot recognized that
refusing to respect another state's judgment violated the interest of that
country. 80 The issuing country also has an interest in seeing that other
countries do not interfere with its domestic policies.8' Likewise, the enforcing
country's interests revolve around aspects of its own foreign and domestic
policies. A treaty would have the difficult task of navigating the different
76 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658
U.N.T.S. 163
77 Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847
U.N.T.S. 23 1.
78 Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 868 (C.A. D.C. 1981).
79 Rosen, supra note I at 795.
80 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1985).
81 Rosen, supra note 1,at 839.
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interests in a manner consistent with the basic legal doctrine engrained in the
signing countries.
A. Areas of Contention
Despite attempts, the United States has been unsuccessful in forming
judgment recognition partnerships within the international community.
Several doctrines and practices make the United States a potentially
inconvenient partner to a convention from the perspective of the rest of the
world. For example, the United States has a starkly different judicial system
than most of the world and its economic reach may make some countries
hesitant to enter a binding convention. The failure of the Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
is but one example of the types of conflicts that impede agreement.
Originally proposed by the United States in 1992, it was a major attempt to
establish international rules for enforcement of foreign judgments. 82 In 1999,
the first draft was presented to the participating fifty-two countries and
overwhelmingly rejected by European and U.S. business communities. 83
Subsequent revisions and the implementation of optional language84 on
contentious points have still not found agreement between the signatories.
Undoubtedly, a major negotiating point for this convention involves
jurisdiction and the other particular areas of contention are not surreptitious.
Mathew H. Adler has synthesized a number of important requirements rangi.ng
from, among other sources, the Hilton decision; the existing Hague Judgments
Convention; and UFMJRA. These requirements include: (1) Finality and
binding nature of the judgment; (2). Subject matter jurisdiction in the
rendering court; (3) Jurisdiction over the parties or the res; (4) Timely and
proper notice of the proceedings; (5) Opportunity to present a defense; (6)

Unbiased rendering court; and (7) The rendering court's proceedings. must
and conducted according to a system of civilized
have been "regular"
85
jurisprudence.
To accede to a judgments convention, the United States will likely
have to give up parts of its minimum-contacts and tag bases of jurisdiction,
Compass Rose International Publications, Overview of Hague Convention on
at
available
Law,
of
Choice
and
Jurisdiction
[hereinafter
htp:www.compassroseintl.com/pubs/HagueConentionOverview.htm.
Overview].
83 Id.
82

4 id.

Matthew H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come? The Need for a
Multilateral Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetary
Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 79, 97-98 (1994).
85
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certain aspects of forum non conveniens, and it may also be asked to adopt the
doctrine of lispendens (notice of pending action) with respect to litigation
involving citizens of Member States.86
B. Existing Examples
Many countries have formed agreements allowing judgments between
foreign countries to pass back and forth with little or no friction. These
conventions have enabled signatories to increase trade and economic relations
while keeping related costs and prices low. Examples of regional conventions
include the Brussels and Lugano Conventions (which the current U.S. attempts
are modeled on to a large extent). The Lugano Convention basically
incorporates all of the key provisions of the Brussels Convention 87 regarding
jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments and replaces nearly
two dozen previous bilateral and88multilateral treaties and conventions
regarding jurisdiction and judgments.
1. NAFTA
Although the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) may
provide some general guidelines for reaching a multilateral treaty and dispute
resolution, it does not include a provision to enforce court judgments. This
could reflect an implicit understanding that laws pertaining to judgment
enforcement are so fundamentally different, even within North America, that
the decision was left to the respective countries.
8

6Danford,

supra note 20, at 414.
Under the Brussels Regulation, supra note 6, a judgment rendered in a signing
state "shall be recognized in the other signing states without any special procedure
being required. Non-recognition is mandated if:
(1) recognition would be contrary to public policy of the forum state,
(2) the judgment was rendered by default and the defendant was not timely
served with a written notice from the institution of the proceedings,
(3) there is a prior inconsistent judgment between the parties,
(4) the judgment concerns status capacity, economic consequences of marriage,
wills, or succession and was reached by applying law that the forum would not have
applied, and,
(5) irreconcilable with a prior judgment of a non-contracting state recognized in
the forum state,
(6) violates another non-recognition agreement,
(7) was rendered by a court exercising exorbitant jurisdiction, or otherwise in
violation of the core jurisdictional provisions (Art. 3-5) of the Convention.
88 Convention on the Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and
55
(Lugano
at
art.
319)
9,
O.J.
(L
1988
1988,
Sept.
16,
Matters,
Commercial
Convention).
87
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For example, in the event of an inbound Mexican judgment or an
outbound U.S. judgment against a Mexican entity, there is a good chance the
debtor would not have to pay unless the judgment's creditor was willing to
spend a large amount of money and endure lengthy battles in court.89 This
inefficiency means that it is economically sensible to pursue only large
amounts across borders. Since a quick and easy method of enforcing
judgments does not exist for U.S. entities, it is likely best to circumvent cross
border judgment enforcement issues through arbitration or requiring security
bonds, letters of credit, and cash in escrow or some other method to ensure
collection.90
2. The New York Convention
Arbitration proceedings are far less complicated than legal
proceedings on account of the predetermination of the arbitral jurisdiction.
Accordingly, arbitrating entities have not seen the same reluctance to enter
into a governing treaty. Over 120 countries have entered into the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
(The New York Convention).91 Were the US to adopt a treaty on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, The New York and
Panama Conventions might help to navigate potential hurdles. In arbitration,
parties voluntarily submit to the will of an arbiter so that fewer jurisdictional
and due process questions arise in the course of a proceeding. With the proper
mechanisms in place, a judgment enforcement treaty could provide similar
benefits and succeed in the same manner.
Certain parallels exist between a court compelling parties to submit to
arbitration and a court enforcing an inbound judgment from a foreign court.
U.S. courts typically employ a four-part test to determine when to compel*
arbitration under the New York Convention:
1. Is there an agreement in writing to arbitrate the subject matter
of the dispute?
2. Does the agreement provide for arbitration in the territory of a
signatory to the Convention?
3. Does the agreement arise out of a legal relationship, whether
contractual or not, that is considered commercial?
89 DAVID
MEXICO (1995)
9 Id.

W.

KASH, ENFORCEMENT

OF JUDGMENTS

ACROSS BORDERS WITH

available at http://www.natlaw.com/pubs/spmxgal.htm.

91 John P. Bowman, Compelling Arbitration in International Case, in
International Litigation: Defending and Suing Foreign Parties in U.S. Federal Courts
176, 189 (David J. Levy ed. 2003).
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4. Is a party to the agreement not an American Citizen, or does
the commercial relationship92have some reasonable relation with
one or more foreign states?
This test effectively represents a summation of established common
law requirements for recognition, but codification makes arbitration more
desirable because the resulting decisions are more easily enforceable between
signatories. 93 The New York Convention requires that "each Contracting State
shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance with
"194
the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon...
Article IV explains that the party makes a prima facie case95 for enforcement if
they produce the original arbitration agreement and award.
3. Other Examples
In 1976, the United States and United Kingdom attempted a
"Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil Matters" but the negotiations over the final text failed in 1981.96 This
failure resulted from U.K. hesitation regarding the enforcement of high
damage awards, as in product liability cases. 97 In general, however, US
judgment creditors experience little apparent difficulty in enforcing judgments
was enforced
in England. For example in 1983, a U.S. $10 million judgment
98
by an English Court in Israel Discount Bank v. Hadjipateras.
The U.S. also entered into negotiations for the "Inter-American
Arbitral
Convention on the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and
00
Awards," in 197999 but no state signed the treaty nor is expected to.

92

Id. at I 89(citing Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273 (5th

Cir. 2002)).
93
Enforcing Foreign Judgments, supra note 58, at 3 n.12, 6-7 n.28.
94 U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1952, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38, at art. III [hereinafter New York Convention].
9 Id. at art. IV.
96 Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil Matters, U.S.- U.K., Oct. 26, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 71 (not in force).
97Symposium, supra note 2.
98NY Bar Survey, supra note 43, at 4.
99 Inter-American Convention on the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign
Judgments and Arbitral Awards, May 8, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1224 (among member states
of the Organization of American States)
100 The following States are Parties to the Convention: Argentina, Bolivia. Brazil,
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras,
Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
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As has been shown, the United States has an interest in courts
consistently enforcing American judgments since the U.S. domestic courts
rarely interfere with judgments against Americans in foreign courts.
Accordingly, U.S. negotiators must be flexible or concede some peripheral
European
issues that are met with stark resistance by other countries.
negotiators continue to insist on the inclusion of some mechanism to govern
the choice of legal forum in civil litigation. 01 Such jurisdictional concerns
stem from their interest in making the international system more accessible to,
and protective of individual consumers. 102
At least some correlation exists between the need for such a treaty
and some major areas of resistance resulting from advancing technology and
the confusion as to how these new elements can be brought within the folds of
an international agreement. For example, "e-commerce" has transcended the
boundaries of traditional jurisdiction and fault in terms of geographic
connection to the harm. 10 3 Europe wants jurisdiction and choice of law based
on the location of the consumer whereas the United States wants jurisdiction
based on the laws under which the transmitting company has been
incorporated.' °4 Another area of contention is whether or not an ISP (internet
service provider) should be liable for transmitted information not under their
control. The United States would seek ISP exemption in this case whereas
Europe would hold them responsible as regulators. 105
If recent trends in the negotiations continue, narrowing the proposed
treaty's scope may be the easiest means of getting the dialogue back on track.
For example, new frontiers involving electronic communication may have to
be omitted until internet growth slows and the various individual policies and
governing law of each nation can be examined and successfully incorporated.
V1. THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION
Public policy is a unilateralist doctrine in that it only considers the
enforcing country's interest and neglects to consider the interests of the
enforcing country. 10 6 Generally, the domestic laws of a recognizing country
require proper notice, proper jurisdiction, final and binding judgment, and no
violation of public policy. The first three requirements are fairly standard, but
the public policy exception is far more broad and subjective. As one
commentator observed, "There are as many definitions of public policy as
101
Overview, supra note 82.
103Id.
104
id.
105Id.
106 Rosen,

supra note 1, at 842.
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there are political wills and political choices."' 0 7 Foreign courts are often
unable to discern a coherent "U.S. policy" on recognition and enforcement
because it comes from not only the fifty different states, but also federal
interpretations of those state opinions. The public policy exception is not well
defined, and while usually construed very narrowly by U.S. courts, outbound
judgments often do not get the same consideration. Under the standard of
Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp.,

U.S. courts may refuse

recognition of a foreign judgment on. public policy grounds only if the
recognition "'injure[s] the public health, the public morals, the public
confidence in the purity of the administration of law, or .... undermines the
personal liberty or of private
sense of security for individual rights, whether
10 8 of
property, which any citizen ought to feel.'
This creates a potentially broad exception, theoretically allowing any
foreign judgment to be refused if the rendering system was not completely in
sync with the United States. Therefore, courts tend to narrowly construe the
exception and only permit its use in rare circumstances, °9 In a Second Circuit
case, Ackerman v. Levine, the U.S. Court of Appeals stated that, "the
narrowness of the public policy exception to enforcement would seem to
reflect an axiom fundamental to the goals of comity and res judicata that
10
underlie the doctrine of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments."
The court then enforced the inbound German judgment on the grounds that
"mere variance with local public policy is not sufficient to decline
enforcement."' 1 There is also great potential for abuse as recognized by the
UFMJRA § 4 comment, "as indicated in [Hilton v. Gi1yot] a mere difference in
the procedural system is not a sufficient basis for non-recognition. A case of
serious injustice must be involved."' 12 To justify its refusal to enforce a
foreign judgment, a U.S. court must find that the judgment not only
affirmatively acts on matters as to which local law is silent, but also
contravenes 3a crucial stated public policy affecting a fundamental interest of
the forum.1
It is unclear how judgments with multiple or punitive damages would
be treated by a convention, but it is likely that 'excessive' damage awards will
107

Symposium, supra note 2.

108 Minehan, supra note 40, at 799 n.21 (citing Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing

Gum Corp.. 453 F.2d 435, 443 (3d Cir. 1971)(quoting Goodyear v. Brown, 26 A. 665,
666 (Pa. 1893)).
109Minehan, supra note 40, at 799, n.20.
110 Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 842 (2d Cir. 1986).
11]Id.
112

UFMJRA, supra note 29, at §4.
Mexicana Rediodifusora Franteriza v. Spann, 41 F.Supp 907, 908-

113 Compania

09 (N.D. Tex. 1941), affd 131 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1942).
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have to be curbed in some manner1 14 according to a public policy exception.
The United States should recognize that it has the most to gain since it already
enforces most inbound judgments without a treaty. The public policy
exception may be the key since it acts as a safety valve for countries engaging
a psychological incentive by countering
with the United States and provides
15
the fears of hesitant countries.'
VII. CONCLUSION

A majority of the U.S. outbound judgments are enforced because the
typical foreign defendants in U.S. courts are large multinational organizations
with domestic assets for parties to satisfy judgments. 116 When there is a claim
involving a smaller foreign corporation it might be easier to just enter the
foreign jurisdiction to litigate the claim since there is a far greater likelihood of17
encountering a problem enforcing the U.S. court's judgment abroad."
Signing and implementing a treaty does not appear to be of any great urgency
for the United States or its trading partners but it should be for many reasons.
Not only would a treaty assist the continued involvement of the United States
in the world market, certain concessions would also demonstrate the U.S.
desire to harmonize the international legal world to eliminate uncertainties. As
mentioned above, there are many obstacles to be traversed of which
jurisdiction seems to be a key area of contention. Although counter to its own
historical legal practices, the United States should consider abandoning its
minimum contact test when involved in international cases. Professor
Weintraub notes that the U.S. agreement to "black list" general jurisdiction
based only on conducting business in the forum state (as opposed to being
incorporated there) would prevent U.S. plaintiffs from filing suit in only a few
particular types of cases, and he believes that this type of jurisdiction
118 is well
worth giving up if a judgments convention can be won in exchange.
To date, the problem of enforcing U.S. judgments "has not been
considered serious enough to warrant widespread attention from U.S.
legislators and policymakers."1 9 The masses of aggrieved judgment creditors
have not yet started testifying before Congress, and there has been no
Lowenfeld & Silberman, supra note 4.
115Minehan, supra note 40.
116
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Hague Judgments Convention?, 24
111, 116 (1998).
117
id.
114

118
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Russell J. Weintraub, How Substantial Is Our Need for a Judgments-

Recognition Convention and What Should We Bargain Away to Get It?, 24 BROOK..J.
INT'L L. 167, 188-189 (1998).

119
Danford, supra note 20, at 432.
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significant media coverage of the matter. 21 0 However, we should keep in mind
that U.S. economic power in the new global economy will continue only as
long as we are able to co-exist with the rest of the world. Establishing an
agreement in which the United States is able to have a voice in the outcome is
crucial to American interests and it should not wait until treaty entrance is
necessary. If this happened, the United States would certainly have to forgo
and concede more important "American style" legal practices than it would if
such an agreement was forged sooner rather than later.

120 id.

